

THE PRESIDENT'S "STAY THE COURSE" STRATEGY IN IRAQ: *The Impact on Troop Readiness*

Straining Our Troops:

- Number of U.S. troops currently in Iraq (approximate): **135,000** [House Armed Services Committee]
- Number of additional U.S. combat troops to be sent to Iraq, according to President Bush's escalation plan: **21,500**
- Number of additional U.S. troops, including both combat and support troops, that may be actually needed under the President's escalation plan, according to the Congressional Budget Office: **as many as 48,000** [[CBO, 2/1/07](#)]
- Number of soldiers in the Army that have served more than one tour in Iraq: **170,000** [[Christian Science Monitor, 1/9/07](#)]
- Percent of the Army's available active duty combat brigades that have served at least a 12-month tour in Iraq or Afghanistan: **100** [[Washington Post, 9/14/06](#)]
- Number of active duty or reserve brigades in the U.S. considered "combat ready": **0** [[Christian Science Monitor, 9/22/06](#)]
- Number of active duty military that have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001: **1,044,939** [CRS, 1/10/07]
- Number of National Guard and Reservists that have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001: **412,215** [CRS, 1/10/07]
- Number of National Guard and Reservists deployed more than once since 2001: **84,198** [DoD, 8/31/06]
- Percent of troops currently deployed that are in the National Guard and Reserves: **25** [DoD, 12/31/06]
- Percent of National Guard combat and special operations battalions mobilized since September 11th: **95** [Foreign Policy Leadership Council, 2/06]
- Length of average mobilization for Reserve and National Guard members: **18 months** [[Washington Post, 11/5/06](#)]
- Number of Army National Guard companies providing security in Iraq in 2004: **20** [[Washington Post, 11/5/06](#)]
- Number of Army National Guard companies gearing up to provide security in Iraq in 2007: **50** [[Washington Post, 11/5/06](#)]

Failing to Adequately Equip and Train Our Troops:

- Amount of the Army's equipment shortage when the Iraq war began: **\$56 billion** [[Washington Post, 2/12/07](#)]
- Amount of essential equipment the Army National Guard has on-hand here at home: **30%** [GAO Testimony, 9/21/06]

- Amount Army needs to repair or replace equipment destroyed/deteriorated in Iraq: **\$66.1 billion** [[CBS/AP, 9/25/06](#)]
- Amount of time Army needs to catch up on backlog of equipment repairs generated from Iraq war: **3 years** [[ABC News, 2/10/07](#)]
- Number of months after U.S. invasion of Iraq that all American soldiers received body armor: **18**
- Number of advanced Humvee armor kits that the Army is short in Iraq and Afghanistan: **more than 4,000** [[Washington Post, 2/12/07](#)]
- Percent of Oklahoma National Guard lacking M-4 rifles: **One-third** [[New York Times, 2/22/07](#)]
- Number of rifles the Arkansas National Guard is short for the state's 39th Brigade Combat Team: **600** [[New York Times, 2/22/07](#)]
- Amount of funding the Pentagon cut for weapons in heavy use in Iraq in 2005 and 2006: **\$3 billion** [[Wall Street Journal, 12/12/06](#)]
- Amount of time between Iraq deployments soldiers of the 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division had to perform a year's worth of training: **4 months** [[San Francisco Chronicle, 2/4/07](#)]

Quotes from Military Leaders and Experts

Gen. Peter Schoomaker

Chief of Staff United States Army

“To meet combatant commanders’ immediate wartime needs, we pooled equipment from across the force to equip soldiers deploying in harm’s way...This practice, which we are continuing today, increases risk for our next-to-deploy units and limits our ability to respond to emerging strategic contingencies.” [[Washington Post, 1/30/07](#)]

Maj. Gen. Harry M. Wyatt III

Commander of the Oklahoma National Guard

“We’re behind the power curve, and we can’t piddle around...” [[New York Times, 2/22/07](#)]

Lt. Gen. Stephen Speakes

Army’s deputy chief of staff for force development

“We don’t have the [armor] kits and we don’t have the trucks.” [[Washington Post, 1/30/07](#)]

Lt. Gen. Stephen Blum

National Guard Chief

“I am not as comfortable as some others seem to be in accepting the low readiness levels here at home...It creates a problem. It will cost us time and time translates into lives.” [[Associated Press, 1/24/07](#)]

Lt. Col. Clifford Wheeler

Commander with the Third Infantry Division’s First Brigade

“We haven’t spent as much time as I would like on learning the local culture, language, and politics – all the stuff that it takes a while to get really good at.” [[Wall Street Journal, 12/12/06](#)]

Lt. Col. Paul Yingling

Third Armored Cavalry Regiment

“It is incredibly frustrating for combat veterans to return to Iraq for the third time with only minimal training on the skills we know are essential, like language, culture, intelligence and local security force development...Army units don’t fail to train on these tasks because we’re stupid or lazy; we fail because we don’t have the time to do it right.” [[Wall Street Journal, 12/12/06](#)]

First Sgt. Bradley Feltman

Third Infantry Division

“We got training, but not graduate-level training. In a couple of months, my guys are going to be busting down doors, and it will be the first time they see some of their equipment for real.” [[Wall Street Journal, 12/12/06](#)]

Lawrence Korb

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Reagan Administration

“It’s happening just about to all the units now...No unit is completely combat ready.” [[San Francisco Chronicle, 2/4/07](#)]

Loren Thompson

Defense Analyst with the Lexington Institute

“A typical soldier shows up in Iraq without the knowledge of the language, without the knowledge of the people...If he also isn’t experienced with his unit or with his weapon, that maximizes the potential for disaster.” [[San Francisco Chronicle, 2/4/07](#)]